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State Power and 
Reproductive Freedom 
In 1975 as a slightly irregular gradu- 
ate student-white-haired, post- 
menopausal-I was faced with that 
most complex modern version of the 
male puberty rite. I had to write a 
thesis. After several years in school, I 
realized that I had not the slightest 
idea of how to do this. As in all ri- 
tualistic procedures, uncertainty and 
cabalism are used to heighten the 
nervous tension: one is told one must 
do it, one can do it, but one is never 
told how to do it. Some kind of 
alchemy will be hsed with institu- 
tional approval to produce what is 
referred to as an "original work of 
knowledge." Now, if my studies had 
taught me anything, they had taught 
me that there were precious feworigi- 
nal works of scholarship around: I 
even had a deep suspicion that Plato 
and the authors of the Book of Gen- 
esis had been cribbing from lost oral 
traditions, exploiting the absence of 
copyright law. In fact, the only really 
original stuff that I had read was new 
feminist writing: de Beauvoir, 
Millett, and Firestone had published, 
but hadn't found their way into any 
of the reading lists that I'd ploughed 
through. Further, there were no fac- 
ulty who had actually read this work 
and, in any case, they thought this 
stuff (which they hadn't read) was 
"derivative," they told me. "Deriva- 
tive from what?" I asked. Cold look 
"From the traditionn I was told. It 
took about three minutes for me to 
understand that what this meant was 
that the tradition was essentially and 
exclusively masculine. Main-stream 
thought was not main-stream but 
male-stream thought. 
I had of course recognized much 
earlier, before I went to school at all, 
in hct, that I wanted to do a feminist 
thesis, but I had not thought much 
beyond the notion ofprovidingcriti- 
cal proof of the generic one-sidedness 
ofthevaunted tradition. In thisspirit, 
I had done quite a bit of research for 
a thesis on John Milton. Milton 
comes into the curriculum of politi- 
cal theory not as a poet but as a 
pamphleteer. During the bourgeois 
revolution in England, he wrote pam- 
phlets for Puritan Liberalism; he was 
even assigned the task ofwriting the 
justification for the execution of the 
King, which is as fine an omelette of 
law and ideology as one could ever 
hope to swallow. But he also com- 
posed polemical pamphlets on di- 
vorce, advocating divorce by con- 
sent, which sounds progressive until 
one findsout that only theconsent of 
the husband was valid. Not surpris- 
ing, from the man who used all that 
poetic power to libel Eve and Delilah. 
But I was bored with this self-right- 
eous puritan before I even thought 
about what I might say about him in 
a thesis, except that I was impressed 
by the note of hysteria which crept 
into his voice when he spoke of pa- 
ternal rights and the power of the 
"sacred seed" as the true source of 
life. Fathers would decide, had the 
dren of nature for mothers. It would 
be many beforeSomer Brodribb 
and Sheila McIntyre introduced me 
to the legal concept ofpatcr cst: "The 
mother is always certain. The father 
is he to whom the marriage points," 
and to the perception that paternity 
is a legal fiction rather than, like 
maternity, a human truth grounded 
in the materiality of reproductive 
experience. 
But Milton's ideological ram- 
blings, the prose issue of Adam's rib 
and Lucifer's rebellion, did set me 
thinking about birth and the impli- 
cations of the uncertainty of pater- 
nity. I had just spent five years read- 
ing political philosophy, pondering 
on notions of power and commu- 
nity, of law and of consent, of States 
and Constitutions, of tyrannies and 
parliaments, but I had readverylittle 
about birth. There were, of course, 
Locke and Hegel and such charac- 
ters, eloquent on the subject of he- 
reditary power and its evils and he- 
It took about three 
minutes for me to 
understand that what 
right to decide the fate of "theirn 
children and "their" wives, even to 
this meant was that 
the point of divorcing them for not the tradition was 
making men comfortable. The great essentiallv and 
liberal imagination had its limita- 
tions. Milton wanted to escape from exclusively masculine. 
his own nasty marriage to a much Main-stream thought 
- 
younger and not especially submis- 
sive wife. This is known in male- 
was not main-stream 
stream thought as "objective analy- but male-~tream thought 
sis." But ofcourse, children and wives 
were of law for men but merely chil- 
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reditary property and its goods, but 
silent on the historical nature ofbirth. 
There was not a total neglect of the 
natural and biological worlds among 
political theorists-Machiavelli 
dreaded nature for "hern inconstancy 
and uncertainty, and M m  in fact 
rooted his whole philosophy on the 
material basis of our need to repro- 
duce ourselves and our species; but 
species production for M m  was a 
The midwife in me said 
again and again: birth is 
cultural: it is a unity of 
natural and cultural 
processes. Labour is real. 
Women may not be able 
to stop what they are 
doing, but they know 
what they are doing. 
They are conscious of 
themselves as reproducers. 
by-product ofproductive forces. Aha 
. . . that was true . . . wasn't it? We 
have to eat to live at both the indi- 
vidual and species level, and to eat we 
must work--or some of us must 
work. Labour. The core of Marx's 
epistemology. But when I said that 
word "labour" my understanding 
went right back to my days as a 
midwife, and knew that there was 
more than one kind of labour. In 
fact, my first immediate understand- 
ing of labour was that labour which 
brings forth the child. Maybe I could 
write a thesis about that? In fact, I 
did, but not without a great deal of 
preliminary struggle. 
The struggle came about because I 
had been taught, in the male tradi- 
tion, to think dualistically. We un- 
derstand things by their opposites, 
or we must separate one thing from 
every other thing before we under- 
stand why it is that particular thing, 
or we must simply face the fact that 
we as individuals are doomed to be 
dualistically constituted because we 
standopposed to 'The Other": Sartre 
at his most hysterical extreme, claw- 
ing his way out of all these slimy 
holes ofotherness. Even my heroine, 
de Beauvoir, posited otherness as 
absolute. So when I tried to think 
systematically about birth, I was dis- 
tracted by this notion of otherness, 
this separation of nature and history, 
of mind and body, of family and 
State, of selfand others. I had hrther 
been taught to think causally, but 
told that to ascribe causality to the 
biological world was biological re- 
ductionism and to practice biologi- 
cal reductionism was to endanger 
man's free will. I didn't care too 
much about man's free will, which I 
thought to be both exaggerated and 
abominably abused, and in any case, 
the midwife in me said again and 
again: birth is cultural; it is a unity of 
natural and cultural processes. La- 
bour is real. Women may not be able 
to stop what they are doing, but they 
know what they are doing. They are 
conscious of themselves as reproduc- 
ers. There is such a thing as repro- 
ductive consciousness, and it differs 
between men andwomen. Male con- 
sciousness is alienated from the proc- 
ess of reproduction. Man is related to 
his child only by thought, by knowl- 
edge in general, rather than by expe- 
rience in particular-whereas moth- 
erhood is a unity of consciousness 
and knowing on the one hand, and 
action (reproductive labour) on the 
other. 
It is in this way that I came to deve- 
lop the notion that not only were the 
cultural forms of the social and legal 
relations of reproduction historical, 
but that the actual process of repro- 
duction, the integration of doing 
and knowing, which women experi- 
ence, and the separation which men 
experience, are historically developed 
forms of consciousness. I was nerv- 
ous of this judgement-would I ever 
dare show it to my even more nerv- 
ous thesis c o m m i t t e d i d  I actually 
believe it myself? If so, why? 
1 was outraged that none of the 
works I had read paid any attention 
to the historical and philosophical 
aspects of human reproduction: the 
meaning of birth, the necessity for 
women's labour to reproduce the 
species in history. (In political theory, 
the defence of the State as man's 
supreme achievement, that which 
transcends such dubiously human 
events as birth, livelihood, bodily 
well-being in the glory of law, order, 
and power. In making the state, men 
believe themselves to be making his- 
tory.) Yet, surely birth is a substruc- 
ture, a condition of history, surely it 
is an act, a conscious act of labour? 
Surely it is not mere biological event 
but human action? But of course, it 
is a women 5 act, and few women had 
written any of the books I had been 
reading for years, and few women 
formulated the power and the glory 
of the state. 
Why is it important that birth be 
understood as historical? Because it 
is the ground of certain sets of social 
relations which, I was convinced, 
needed to be changed, and change is 
what history is about. Birth itself 
may be a natural phenomenon, but 
in fact a great deal of history-in 
culture, certainly in law, in ideol- 
ogy-has been piled on it. Yet the 
birth process itself was regarded as 
changeless, and therefore by defini- 
tion ahistorical, natural, contingent, 
occasionally miraculous but usually 
uninteresting. In and of itself, birth 
process has no meaning-until men 
give it one. 
In my analysis of the history of 
birth process, as opposed to the so- 
cial construction of childrearing or 
marriage or legal forms which arise 
from it, I discovered that birth proc- 
ess, when understood as a unity of 
knowledge and practice, rather than 
an animal accident, hadchanged only 
twice. The first change, a very long 
time ago, was the discovery of h at er- 
nity, with all its contradictions of 
alienation and freedom. Paternity is 
not present to consciousness in an 
immediate way, and therefore must 
have been discovered in historical 
time and discovered in the mode of 
causality. The second, indeed the 
historical condition which I believe 
has led many feminists to turn to the 
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process of birth with new under- 
standing, was the change wrought by 
reproductive technology on a poten- 
tially universal scale in our time. In 
1975 I and many others could see 
that this development was enor- 
mously significant, that it was what 
Hegel called a "World-historical 
event," a happening which would 
transform not only ancient institu- 
tions but which would bring about 
transformations in our conscious- 
ness of ourselves, our bodies, our 
historical and social being. The ques- 
tions were: what kind of changes and 
who would control and direct these 
changes? How could a State designed 
to transcend mere birth, crude biol- 
ogy, deal with this historicization of 
the ahistorical with the politicization 
of the pre-political? In fact, the State 
has no difficulty in doing this, for its 
willing surrogates, the medicine men, 
the legal establishment, and the sci- 
entists, are all ready to face down the 
possibility that reproductive tech- 
nology might serve to establish re- 
productive freedom for women. 
I should note that back then, just 
ten years ago, what I meant by repro- 
ductive technology was the pill, but 
I had read Brace Nm, World, and 
knew it wouldn't stop there. Frankly, 
I had no perception of the speed of 
development, that in 1985 wewould 
be dealing with AIDS, surrogating, 
freeze-dried sperms, and a scientific 
dramaturgy played out on the stage 
of petri dishes. I had rather naive 
visions that reproductive technology 
would liberate women, usher in re- 
productive choice and transform the 
social relations ofreproduction fairly 
directly. I don't believe this was fun- 
damentally wrong, but my time-ta- 
ble was a little sanguine. What was 
inseparable from the technology 
question was the question of power 
and of control. Men have always 
defined the social parameters of the 
forms ofreproductive relations. They 
have also controlled technological 
development. It is this old male con- 
trol of production, conjoined with 
new male control of reproduction, 
which makes the development of 
reproductive technology a political 
question, a historical happening of a 
momentous kind and a renewed 
struggle for reproductive power. The 
implications are awesome. There is 
no single issue which unifies the hu- 
man need to produce for survival on 
an individual basis and to reproduce 
for survival on a species basis in the 
way that reproductive technology 
does. 
Reproductive technology makes 
the marriage ofcapitalism and patri- 
archy fecund. There is no issuewhich 
throws down the challenge to women 
to seize control of their usurped re- 
productive power in the way that 
this issue does. There is no issue in 
which the holding in balance of the 
laws of the natural world and the law 
of the historical world offers us radi- 
cal choices and possible transforma- 
tions of such a hndamental kind. I 
believe that the powerll develop- 
ment of the women's movement in 
recent years is grounded in the trans- 
formation of our reproductive cxpe- 
rience, and is not a wave or a spasm 
but a new unity of species and self- 
consciousness: feminists understand 
that these changes require a newer, 
braver, more just world if they are to 
be humane and liberating. They also 
know that we do not have a just 
world, we do not have the rule of 
justice. We have the rule of men, 
patriarchy, a historical megalosaur 
which does not yet recognize that it 
has earned extinction. This man's 
world has consigned the very condi- 
tion ofhistory-birth-to the world 
of nature and pure biology which 
man understands as his enemy. It has 
constructed the institution of the 
private realm in which the tasks of 
birthing and rearing can be control- 
led by man's grandiose projection of 
his universality into the state, the 
public realm. This man's world, in 
which birth is animal and death is 
splendid, in which destruction is 
noble and conservation soft-headed, 
this man's world in which control of 
production and reproduction are the 
political and economic tools ofpatri- 
archal survival; this man's world in 
which the unifying concept of spe- 
cies itself fractures into the divisions 
of gender, race, wealth, sexuality in a 
mammoth exercise of divide and 
conquer: this is the world which cre- 
ated the processes in which women 
could be oppressed but not obliter- 
ated, in which children could be 
claimed and named but not neces- 
sarily cared for: the process in which 
alienated fathers consolidated a legal 
claim to real power over women's 
reproductive lives. This power over 
women is clearly still not enough: 
mankind now aspires to buttress that 
control with the mastery of the natu- 
ral world, the scientific and technical 
control of species reproduction, the 
ultimate triumph over the treacher- 
ous inconstancy of nature and her 
accomplice, women. Reproductive 
technology and the technology of 
species destruction are conjoined in 
a lethal alliance which would negoti- 
ate the gap between individual and 
species by destroying both. 
We must never for one moment 
believe that we are dealing here with 
pure technology, any more than we 
believe that star wars are pure sci- 
ence. These are the strategies of a 
ruling gender dizzy with the power 
of denying the grounds of human 
being in the labour of birthing 
women. This is not, of course, to say 
that reproduction is in any sense 
sacred, 'that it cannot be tampered 
with, that it is beyond human trans- 
formation. Women in particular have 
clear interests in controlling their 
Reproductive technology 
makes the marriage of 
capitalism and patriarchy 
fecund. There is no issue 
which throws down 
the challenge to women 
to seize control of their 
usurped reproductive 
power in the way that 
this issue does. 
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r i f j  violence, to reap profits, to 
mutilate the good earth's abundance. 
Can one think of a more sterile am- 
bition for any civilization than that 
of "conquering space," the coloni- 
zation of emptiness? Can one really 
think of robotic heroism? The old 
ideology of the creative power of the 
divine seed, the sacred sperm, pales 
beside the notion of automated pro- 
creation. 
It is against this frenzy that the 
feminist movement lives and grows 
and struggles. The changes in repro- 
ductive process are both grounds of 
and challenge to the feminist move- 
ment. This is not another sectarian 
revolt. Feminism has redefined revo- 
lution. Always understood as a vio- 
advantages in redefining re-volution, 
not least ofwhich is the fact that the 
antagonists do not see what is really 
happening. Politicians seem to think 
of us as a new voice (shrill of course), 
a new vocal minority to be wooed for 
votes, what I saw described recently 
as a spontaneous movement rather 
than a revolutionary one. Employers 
think of us as a reserve labour force 
now on the uppity side, needing to 
be disciplined by low wages and lay- 
offs and part-time participation in 
the job of earning our, after all, less 
demanding livelihoods. Some men 
think of our liberated sexuality as 
their escape from the bondage of the 
private realm and the responsibility 
inseparable from the continuity of 
and life which denies conventional 
patriarchal preoccupations with 
crude causalities and violent con- 
frontations, with objectivity eroded 
by deathwishes andsubjectivityiden- 
tified with power. Who is to do all 
this? Who is to attack all this? Who 
is to destroy it? Who is to replace it? 
Women, we answer, and such men 
who can transcend their own his- 
tory. But who are women? Here, we 
stand face-to-face with the misogy- 
nist interpretation ofpatriarchal his- 
tory, the pro-masculine essence of 
the State and of knowledge. Edward 
0. Wilson, the great white father of 
socio-biology, asserts that "The fe- 
male of the species is quintessentially 
a producer of eggs." Quintessence, 
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you will recall, the fifth essence, was 
posited by the ancients as the sub- 
stance forming entities not obviously 
composed of the four elements of 
earth, fire, air, and water which their 
science had identified. Quintessence 
was also thought to the substance of 
which the heavenly bodies were 
formed. This does not seem to be the 
sort ofascription Wilson had in mind 
(although my friend Milton would 
have been quite happy with a quin- 
tessence for the sacred sperms). 
Wilson means essential but more so, 
and commits this etymological gaffe 
in his desire to suggest that egg pro- 
ducing is not only an essentially femi- 
nine task, but the only significant 
thing we do. This view of women as 
essentially breeders, preferably of 
healthy children with clearly accred- 
ited fathers, is the quintessence of 
patriarchal ideology-a substanceless 
substantiation. The assertions of the 
historical significance of reproduc- 
tion, of the reality of reproductive 
consciousness, of the moral nature of 
the mother-child bond: all of these 
are in danger of slipping into the 
crude causality and abstract 
determinisms of socio-biology (and 
its new step-son, bio-ethics) ifwe de- 
historicize them, if we try to cram 
them into patriarchal categories of 
language and thought. The separa- 
tion of the child, the unknowability 
of biological parenthood which men 
experience, produce birth as a causal 
concept of men's minds rather than 
as an issue ofwomen's unity of con- 
sciousness, experience, and repro- 
ductive labour. In their birthing po- 
tential, as mothers, as midwives, as 
carers, women unify nature and his- 
tory in a way not accessi ble to mascu- 
line experience. We cannot use their 
abstract notions to construct the so- 
ciety which validates our real collec- 
tive wnsciousness as women. 
Yet, that alien experience has 
formed our culture, an alienation 
which now sees no contradiction 
between biological and technical 
determinations, which are as crude 
in conception as they are sophisti- 
cated in execution. The crisis in 
reproductivity has projected its pa- 
triarchal InOInenNm and muddled 
morality upon the ancient practice 
ofabortion rather than on the crucial 
contemporary problematics of repro- 
ductive technology. 
Women's struggles to control their 
own bodies are historid struggles, 
and are central to the abortion war, 
but it is not women who have de- 
fined abortion as the single locus of 
reproductive politics. This strategy 
serves to deflect attention andenergy 
away from the deeper and more im- 
portant issue of reproductive tech- 
nology which is a more powerful 
weapon of control in terms of patri- 
archy, which doesn't eat up law of- 
ficers of the State, and which has a 
potential for the generation ofprofit, 
thereby making it attractive to the 
ruling class. The abortion struggle is 
ideological in that it produces a clash 
between two opposing abstractions, 
the emptied perceptions of right and 
an equally empty ideology of pure 
life. This is a difficult and ofien 
divisive issue for women because the 
whole business is trapped in ideo- 
logical formulations: pure life on the 
one hand and the concept of right on 
the other which, without the legal 
verification which gives content to 
right, becomes merely an assertion of 
"naturaln right, pure empty right 
pitted against pure dehistoricized life. 
The liberal solution to this 
impasse, a retreat to situa- 
tion ethics, is not verysatis- 
factory; the conservative 
position of sticking mind- 
lessly to patriarchal ideol- 
ogy is even less so. 
We cannot bring change 
by changing the meanings 
of words, but we cannot 
identify political strategies 
ofethical positions by start- 
ing with ideological defini- 
tions. I would argue that 
the definition of "lifen 
which patriarchy has pro- 
duced is grounded in men's 
- 
existential separation from 
species continuity rather 
than women's integrative 
experience of birth. If "life- 
as-suchn is an absolutevalue 
then we must never swat a fly, hmi-  
gate a fungus, catch a fish, nor boil a 
quintessential egg. This is why the 
concept of Right must be added to 
the crude affirmation of life but right 
itself is a political legal concept of a 
quite murky kind. 
Human life, ofcourse, is presumed 
to be "differentn from other forms of 
life, a difference which men have 
usually attributed to the possession 
of rationality-a quality more satis- 
factory in theory than visible in prac- 
tice-and the exercise of choice 
which is dangerous in women who 
have no rationality. All ofthis has led 
to extraordinary fights over when in 
fact a foetus becomes human. 
This obscure and abstract debate 
can only take place in a world in 
which men have usurped the right to 
give meaning to experience, includ- 
ing the experience from which they 
are biologically excluded, that of giv- 
ing birth. The transformation from 
life in general to human life in par- 
ticular comes, I would argue, in the 
concrete labour of women. (Marx 
defined labour as the creation of 
value, but he did not heed the value 
produced by women's reproductive 
labour.) This work is a unification of 
bodily labour with human conscious- 
ness, a unity of knowledge and expe- 
rience which defines the human as 
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the species which knows what it is 
doing in the act of giving birth: it is 
creating value, the value of human 
life, a cultural and individual value 
which is consciously experienced by 
the labouring reproducer. Like-as- 
such can have no moral value, for 
value is a good which rests on a 
conscious interpretation ofthe expe- 
rience of being in the world and of 
working in the world. The infant, 
produced by a combination of la- 
bour and consciousness, of culture 
and biology, ofwomen and nature, is 
the human reality of life as opposed 
to that abstract "quintessence" of 
life-undifferentiated, brute, and 
without consciousness. The foetus 
in utero is all ofthese things, and the 
notion that it is already human from 
"conception" is onewhich rests solely 
upon the limp fallacy of the procrea- 
tive power of the alienated sperm, 
the "holy seed" of patriarchal ideol- 
ogy bestows life. Abortion is neither 
a right nor a crime, but a very diffi- 
cult existential choice related to our 
human participation in species con- 
tinuity, our women's perception of 
the unity of life and living, compli- 
cated by the fact that heterosexual 
relations are conducted in such a 
grotesquely adversarial way. It is an 
odd world in which we casually de- 
cally defensible, while we become 
violent in the defence of a collection 
of cells unvalorized by labour and 
uninterpreted by conscious human 
experience. It is an oddworld, too, in 
which men are taught to value mere 
gratification as essential to mankind's 
greater density. 
All of this deflects our attention 
from a much more vital issue, that of 
reproductive technology. Women are 
understandably ambivalent about 
this; childbirth is no fun, whatever 
the subsequent joys. Technology, a 
male preserve, is a device which may 
award to men that control of the 
species reproduction which has been 
available to them so far only as strat- 
egies for controlling and privatizing 
women. This is not a reason for blind 
resistance to technology, but it does 
mean that we must address the im- 
plications of reproductive technol- 
ogy seriously and thoughtfully. Per- 
haps women will eventually gain by 
the escape from the hazards of la- 
bour, but the species may lose from 
its blindness to the ethical dimen- 
sions of childbearing, usually dis- 
missedcontemptuously in the phrase 
"motherhood issue." Motherhood, 
more broadly understood, may well 
be the ethical issue of the coming de- 
cades, with the implications of car- 
ing and conserving life which men 
have taught women to understand as 
mere sentiment, but which in fact 
stroy millions of people, the valiable 
products of women's reproductive 
labour, and find these killings ethi- 
have a capacity for mediation of 
dualism, for integration, for re- 
producing the world-a capac- 
ity which is absent fiom the 
sterile deductive categories of 
axiomatic and syllogistic ethics. 
It is good to see women 
breaking down the barriers of 
the legal profession, in the light 
of these momentous historical 
issues, not only in terms of 
careers, but in terms of bting- 
ing to legal knowledge and to 
legal practice the insight and 
determination of women's 
practice and feminist vision. It 
is by law, after all, that the 
patriarchal states built their 
~UhUrd hegemony, consolidat- 
Somer Brodribb, Mary O'Brien, Cath McNaughton ing the ofthe father in 
84 CANADIAN WON 
the legitimation of children, placing 
the existential bonds of legal mar- 
riage on women, legislating male 
power and tacitly, or even overtly, 
legitimizing violence in the h i l y .  
From the judge on the bench to the 
cop on the beat, from the statesman 
in public to the patriarch in private, 
men's laws have ruled women's lives 
and appropriated women's children 
as soon as they were old enough not 
to need a mother's toil and patience, 
though they never seem to grow old 
enough not to need her sacrificial 
love. And it is to the law that the 
reproductive technocrats turn for the 
legitimation of their procedures, for 
the patent of approbation and the 
license to exercise the ultimate con- 
trol, that of the reproduction of the 
species. The women's movement, at 
this moment in history, needs avoice 
in law, and it is good to be here and 
know the voice is speaking, neither 
rx  cathedra nor pontifically, but in 
sweet tune with the aspirations of 
women in all walks of life. We need 
that voice. As a movement, we need 
your knowledge and your political 
commitment, your sense and your 
concern, to mount the necessary cri- 
tique of and resistance to the robotic 
technological hysteria of the new 
baby-farmers. We need your help to 
understand the processes and 
strategisms in which male control of 
reproduction is being consolidated 
and how to challenge that. But most 
ofall, we need you as all women need 
each other, to fight the good fight 
which will transform ~atriarchal e- 
galism to feminist justice, justice for 
us, justice for our children, and jus- 
tice for our species. 
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